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Summary
In recent policy discussions in the Netherlands, the Earned Income Tax Credit ~EITC! has been put
forward as an instrument to reduce the unemployment rate among low-skilled workers. Using MIMIC,
CPB’s applied general equilibrium model for the Netherlands, this article discusses the economic im-
pact of different forms of the EITC. The analysis reveals that moderately targeting the EITC to the
unskilled makes the instrument more effective in reducing unemployment. The targeting concept fea-
tures decreasing returns, however. Indeed, it may be counterproductive if the EITC is targeted at a
very small income range. Furthermore, targeting the EITC to the low skilled induces adverse effects
on the quality and quantity of labour supply because it raises the marginal tax burden on medium-
income workers.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The Netherlands suffer from a relatively high structural unemployment rate among
low skilled workers. In 1996, the unemployment rate among the low skilled was
more than twice the unemployment rate of skilled workers. One explanation for
this phenomenon is thought to be the poor labour market incentives for the low
skilled unemployed. Indeed, the replacement rate at the bottom of the labour mar-
ket, deﬁned as the net social beneﬁt in terms of the net wage rate, is rather high
in the Netherlands. This depresses the motivation for the low-skilled to search
for work and makes them reluctant to accept a job. Therefore, recent tax propos-
als have focused on reducing the replacement rate among the low skilled through
the introduction of a so-called Earned Income Tax Credit ~EITC!. The white pa-
per on taxes in the 21st century in the Netherlands contains a proposal for an
EITC ~Parliament ~1997!!.
The EITC has already been used in the United States for over 20 years. The
experience with the EITC in the US may yield important lessons for the discus-
sion about the EITC in the Netherlands. Therefore, this paper starts by providing
an overview of the literature on the EITC in the US. In the US, the EITC aims
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©2 0 0 0Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.at reducing poverty among low-income workers, without adversely affecting the
incentives for labour supply. In contrast, the proposals for an EITC in the Neth-
erlands primarily aim at reducing the unemployment rate at the bottom of the
labour market. Therefore, the design of the EITC that has been proposed in the
Netherlands differs from the one that exists in the US. This paper adopts the
CPB’s applied general equilibrium model for the Netherlands, MIMIC, to inves-
tigate the labour market effects of different forms of EITC.1
2 THE EITC IN THE US: A SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE
The Earned Income Tax Credit ~EITC! was ﬁrst introduced in the United States
in 1975. It is a credit on the federal income tax,2 designed to help poor working
families. The credit started out as a small program aimed at offsetting the social
payroll tax for poor working families with children. In 1986, 1990 and 1993 there
have been major expansions of the program, making it one of the major instru-
ments for anti-poverty policy in the United States. The 1993 expansion was ini-
tiated by President Clinton, who stated in his ﬁrst State of the Union:
‘The new direction I propose will make this solemn, simple commitment: by ex-
panding the refundable earned income tax credit, we will make history; we will
reward the work of millions of working poor Americans by realizing the principle
that if you work 40 hours a week and you’ve got a child in the house, you will
no longer be in poverty’ ~Shapiro and Greenstein ~1993!!
After the expansion of the program in 1993, a worker with 2 children working
40 hours per week at the minimum wage level was taken out of poverty.3 By
now, the EITC is the largest cash program directed at low-income households.4
2.1 Design of the American EITC
To be eligible for the EITC, a family must meet three requirements. First, there
must be positive earned income. Indeed, the EITC is a credit directed only at
people who work; income from other sources than work is discounted from the
1 The UK is also discussing the possibility of an EITC based on the US model. The current Family
Credit System in the UK shows a number of similarities to the American EITC, see e.g. Walker and
Wiseman ~1997!.
2 Some states offer a supplement to the EITC at state level, but we restrict our attention to the
federal level.
3 The poverty line in 1994 was about $ 15,000.
4 Yin et al. ~1994! estimate the cost of the EITC at $24.5 billion for 1998. To compare, the Aid to
Families with Dependent Children program ~AFDC! costs about $16 billion.
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should be smaller than a certain threshold. In 1996, the maximum income for a
family with 2 children was $28,495. Third, the family should care for a child
younger than 19, a child younger than 24 who is a full time student, or a child
who is disabled regardless of age. Since 1994, there is a small credit for workers
without children.
The EITC contains three ranges. Figure 2.1 illustrates the credit in these ranges
for a household with two children in relation to its total family income for 1996.
First, in the phase-in range, represented by AB in Figure 2.1, people receive a
credit of 40% of their earned income. In 1996, the phase-in range runs up to a
maximum income of $8,890. The line BC in Figure 2.1 represents the so-called
ﬂat range. In particular, households with an annual earned income between $8,890
and $11,610 receive a maximum credit of $3,556. Finally, in the phase-out range,
represented by CD in Figure 2.1, each additional dollar of earned income reduces
the credit by 21 cents. Accordingly, people with an annual income above $28,495
are no longer eligible for the credit. Table 2.1 summarizes the various EITC pa-
rameters for other types of households as well ~where ﬁgures are expressed in
5 There is a proposal to disallow EITC to people with earning from dividends and interest above
some threshold. President Clinton proposed a threshold of $2,500, the Congress proposed $1,000.
Figure 2.1 – The earned income tax credit in the US ~household with two children in 1996!
21 EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT1994 dollars!. Scholz ~1994! estimates that 61 percent of the EITC recipients is
in the phase-out range, 23 percent of the recipients occupies the phase-in range,
the rest is in the ﬂat range.
The design of the EITC in the US implies that the credit is not only awarded
to people below the poverty line. Indeed, eligibility for the EITC extends up to
an earned income of $28,495. Scholz ~1994! estimated that about half of the credit
payments ﬂow to people below the poverty line. In particular, about 7.5 million
of the recipients of the EITC have an income above the poverty line, 5.4 million
people have incomes below the poverty line, while 1.4 million people pass the
poverty line due to the EITC.
The EITC is not only meant as income support for working families with low
incomes, but also as an instrument to stimulate people with low incomes to in-
crease their working hours. Indeed, the EITC is not withdrawn for people who
pass the poverty line as this would substantially discourage labour supply of
people around the poverty line. This makes the EITC less well targeted at work-
ers under the poverty line than a program like the food stamps which is solely
meant as income support. This latter program has high withdrawal rates as it
strongly discourages work effort on the margin. To limit the costs, however, the
EITC needs to be phased out to ensure that households with high incomes do not
receive a credit. Indeed, the phase-out range of the EITC in the US is extended
to household incomes just above the poverty line.
The EITC is the only tax credit in the USA that is refundable. If the credit is
higher than the income tax the taxpayer has to pay, the Internal Revenue Service
~IRS! actually pays the taxpayer the difference. The EITC can be obtained either
in one payment at the end of the year, or in regular payments during the year.
This regular payment in advance takes the form of a negative withholding by the
employer. This latter option is used by less than one percent of the workers who
are eligible for the EITC.







Phase-out rate Income cut-off
1 child 34 $6,330 $11,610 $2,155 15.98 $25,075
21 children 40 $8,890 $11,610 $3,555 21.06 $28,495
no childa 7.65 $4,220 $5,275 $325 7.65 $9,500
a Taxpayer must be between the ages of 25 and 65.
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The EITC in the US is not received automatically: people have to apply for it by
ﬁling a tax return and completing a separate form for the EITC. This causes the
take up rate to be lower than 100% as the US tax system is one of self assess-
ment: potential taxpayers have to identify themselves to the IRS as taxpayers,
instead of the IRS approaching them. People with an income lower than the in-
come tax threshold do not have to ﬁle a tax return. However, if these people are
eligible for the EITC, they should ﬁle a tax return to receive the net payment
they are entitled to.
Despite the problem of getting the EITC to people who are unaware of the
credit, there is a remarkable high take up of the EITC compared to other social
schemes. The take up can be measured by the so-called take-up rate which mea-
sures the number of people that apply for the EITC in terms of the number of
people eligible for it. Using data of the Survey of Income and Program Partici-
pation ~SIPP!, Scholz ~1994! estimated the take up rate of the EITC in 1990 be-
tween 75 to 90 per cent. Most other estimates fell in the range of 80 to 85 per
cent. This is high compared to estimates of the take-up rate of the Aid to Fami-
lies with Dependent Children program ~AFDC! which range from 62 to 72 per
cent, or the food stamps which range from 54 to 66 per cent. One of the reasons
for the high take up rate could be that receiving the EITC involves less stigma-
tization than other programs. Indeed, the EITC is available only for people who
work. Hence, even though the EITC operates as a sort of welfare beneﬁt, it prob-
ably will not be considered as such. Another possible explanation for the high
take up of the EITC may be that people are by deﬁnition working in the formal
sector and can be expected to be better informed about such programs than job-
less people or people who work in the informal sector.
Scholz investigated the characteristics of people who do not ﬁle for the EITC
although they are eligible for it. First, he found that education tends to have a
negative effect on the take up. Second, the take up of the EITC was positively
related to the EITC a taxpayer is entitled to. This suggests that people who do
not claim the EITC, might do this rationally, for instance because the effort of
ﬁling a tax return is greater than the gain from receiving the EITC. An alterna-
tive explanation for people not applying for an EITC is that they do not want to
be known by the IRS as they have been involved in underground activities.
Besides people who do not claim the EITC, there are also people who claim
the EITC without being eligible for it. Indeed, if the number of taxpayers claim-
ing the EITC is divided by the number of people that is found to be eligible by
Scholz, a take up rate of 122 to 131 per cent results. Research conducted by the
IRS over several years suggests that 37 to 46 per cent of the EITC claimants
were claiming too high a credit. Between 28 and 39 per cent of the claimants
were not eligible for any credit at all. The amount of inappropriately claimed
credits was between 29 and 37 per cent. Hence, non-compliance is a problem
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the EITC without being eligible. He found that higher self-employment income
had a positive effect on non-compliance. This self-employment income can be
manipulated more easily than wage income and is therefore more open to fraud.
Another reason for non-compliance could be the rules related to children. A child
is not counted as a qualifying child for the EITC if less than 50% of the total
costs of the child are paid by the taxpayer. With very low incomes, there is a
reasonable chance that more than half of the income is paid by social security.
Hence, the children in those households do not count for the EITC. There is also
evidence that there is a considerable amount of fraud in claiming the EITC. In-
deed, when the number of children had to be reported on the tax return accord-
ing to the social security forms, the number of reported children would decrease
by 10 percent.
2.3 Tax-Transfer Integration
The EITC may be considered as a social welfare transfer. However, in contrast to
most welfare payments that are transferred through the social welfare system, the
EITC is transferred via the tax system. Taxes and transfers can be seen as two
components of the same system, with transfers being negative taxes. This notion
has induced some economists to advocate the integration of the two systems. They
argue that there is no justiﬁcation for the different treatment of people with low
incomes who are paid by the welfare system, and people with high incomes who
pay taxes.
The advantage of providing transfers through the tax system is that traditional
welfare administration is labour-intensive and expensive. Recipients do not like
the welfare system because of the stigma involved in receiving welfare beneﬁts.
Using the tax system could lower administrative costs, reduce the social stigma
and introduce more objective rules. However, there are also disadvantages to the
tax-transfer integration.
Alstott ~1994! described four problems related to tax-transfer integration. First,
the measurement of income in the tax system differs from the welfare system. In
the welfare system, wealth is taken into account which allows for a more accu-
rate assessment of the needs of recipients. Second, the tax system uses a formal
deﬁnition of family. In contrast, the welfare system explores whether there is a
dependency relationship, even if this relationship is not between formal family
members. Third, the annual accounting interval of the tax system makes it im-
possible to adjust to the immediate needs of beneﬁt recipients. When people use
an advance payment option, they run the risk of having to pay back part of the
beneﬁt if their ﬁnancial position changes during the year. Finally, it will be more
difficult to check eligibility within the tax system. Receiving a beneﬁt through
the welfare system involves meetings with a welfare officer, whilst receiving a
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proach makes false applications easier.
In the US, the EITC is what comes closest to tax-transfer integration. When
the EITC was ﬁrst introduced it was almost entirely integrated into the tax sys-
tem, besides some extra questions on the tax return. The expansions of the EITC
changed it more in the direction of other social beneﬁt schemes which require
additional information from the household. Indeed, after the 1990 reform, taxpay-
ers who claim the EITC have to ﬁll in a special form in addition to the normal
tax return. This form raises additional questions, e.g. about their children. On the
one hand, this additional information allows the EITC to be better targeted at
needy people. On the other hand, the information undermines the tax-transfer in-
tegration and increases administrative costs.
2.4 Effect of the EITC on Labour Supply
Research on the economic effects of the EITC in the US is primarily focused on
the effects on labour supply. Standard economic theory suggests that the EITC
affects both participation decisions and the number of hours worked. In particu-
lar, the reduction in the average tax burden on labour income stimulates partici-
pation of people who are currently ~voluntarily! outside the labour force. The
effect on hours worked operates through two different channels. First, the lower
average tax burden for households which are eligible for the EITC adversely af-
fects the incentives to supply labour in hours through the income effect. Second,
the EITC may affect the marginal tax burden on households. In particular, the
marginal tax burden declines for people in the phase-in range, remains constant
for households in the ﬂat range, and rises for those households with an earned
income in the phase-out range. Whereas the lower marginal tax burden in the
phase-in range raises the incentives for labour supply by inducing substitution
from leisure to consumption, the higher marginal tax burden in the phase-out
range reduces labour supply in hours. On balance, the income effect and the two
opposing substitution effects render the effect on aggregate labour supply in hours
ambiguous. Indeed, the effect on aggregate labour supply is an empirical matter
and will depend on the magnitude of labour supply elasticities and the number of
people in the different ranges of the EITC. A number of empirical studies have
explored the effect of the EITC on aggregate labour in the US.
Dickert, Houser and Scholz ~1995!
Empirical evidence seems to support the above mentioned effects. Dickert,
Houser, and Scholz ~1995! simulated the labour supply effects of the changes in
the EITC law from 1993 to 1996. They used data from the 1990 Survey of In-
come and Program Participation to calculate which families would receive the
EITC in 1993 and 1996. Using a simulation model calibrated with labour supply
elasticities from Hausman ~1981!, MaCurdy et al. ~1990! and Triest ~1990!, they
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Dickert et al. are presented in Table 2.2. It reveals that the effects on labour sup-
ply for people in the phase-in range is positive in all simulations, ranging from
1.88 to 13.46 per cent. For people in the phase-out range and the ﬂat range, the
effect on labour supply is negative. In absolute ﬁgures, these adverse effects in
the ﬂat range and the phase-out range are substantially smaller, however. Indeed,
the adverse effect of the EITC in the phase-out range lies between 0.53 and 4.73
per cent. The reason for these smaller effects is that, compared to the other ranges,
there are relatively more women in the phase-in range who feature a relatively
high labour supply elasticity. Furthermore, the reduction in the marginal tax rate
in the phase-in range is larger than the increase in the marginal tax rate in the
phase-out range. Nevertheless, irrespective of what labour supply elasticities are
taken, the effect on aggregate labour supply is always negative. This is because
the ﬂat range and the phase-out range are populated by more people than the
phase-in range.
In the simulations by Dickert et al., the participation effect was ignored. As
this effect on labour supply is strictly positive,7 the negative effects of the EITC
are likely to be smaller than suggested by these simulations.
6 Triest ﬁnds an uncompensated wage elasticity of 0.05 for men and 0.25 for women. The income
elasticities are 0.0 for men and 20.15 for women. The elasticities of Hausman and MaCurdy et al.
are higher and lower, respectively.
7 The only people who might stop participating because of the EITC are partners. If the primary
earner is in the EITC range without the partner’s income, but outside the EITC range with the part-
ner’s income, this could be an incentive for the partner to give up working.
TABLE 2.2 – THE RESULTS OF THE SIMULATIONS BY DICKERT, HOUSER AND SCHOLZ
Estimated per cent change in annual hours workeda
MaCurdy et al. Triest Hausman
Aggregate labour 20.09 20.54 24.04
By credit range
Phase in 1.88 3.92 13.46
Flat 20.09 20.19 21.79
Phase-out 20.53 21.11 24.73
NOTE: The estimates given are median percentage changes. Medians are presented in-
stead of means because a small number of very low income parents in the subsidy range
have extremely high marginal rates and, therefore, extremely large simulated wage effects.
a The median monthly hours for the sample is 160.
Source: Dickert, Houser and Scholz ~1995!.
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Eissa and Liebman ~1996! took both the participation effect and the hours-
worked effect into account. In particular, they compared two groups of single
women, namely those with children and those without children. Because the EITC
is available only to people with children, only single women with children are
expected to respond to the EITC. Single women with children make up almost
ﬁfty per cent of the EITC eligible population. Eissa and Liebman examined the
impact of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which included an increase of the EITC
besides other changes in the tax system. The other changes in the tax system
were expected to affect single women with and without children in the same fash-
ion. Therefore, the change in labour supply of women with children could be
compared to the change in labour supply of women without children to estimate
the effect of the EITC on labour supply. Eissa and Liebman also compared some
alternative groups, such as women with children and low education versus women
without children and low education. The data they used were taken from the
March Current Population Surveys for the years 1985 to 1987 and 1989 to 1990.
The data on labour market and income were taken from the year before the sur-
vey.
The participation effect of the EITC on single women with children was esti-
mated at 2.5 per cent. This suggests that the EITC indeed increased participation.
Eissa and Liebman also used probit regressions and they tried to avoid selection
biases. In that case, the effects ranged from 1.4 per cent for all single women
with children to 3.7 per cent for single women with children and low education.
An explanation for the strong response of low-educated women is that women
with a lower education have a higher possibility of earning an income in the
EITC range. This suggests that the participation response was indeed caused by
the EITC. The authors also investigated whether prior trends in labour market
participation, the business cycle or changes in the AFDC may be possible expla-
nations for the higher rise in participation of women. It turned out that these
explanations do not overturn the positive effect of the EITC on labour market
participation.
Eissa and Liebman also estimated the effect of the EITC on hours worked by
people who were eligible for the EITC. In their regressions, the effects of the
EITC on labour supply turned out to be positive, but not signiﬁcantly different
from zero. Accordingly, they argued that there was no evidence that the EITC
decreased the number of hours worked by women already in the labour force.
Hence, the participation decision seemed more elastic than the decision about the
number of hours worked. Eissa and Liebman’s explanation for this result is that
most recipients receive the credit as a lump sum payment and are therefore un-
aware of the high marginal tax rates in the phase-out range. Indeed, most people
who received the credit did not understand how the EITC worked or did not even
know that they received the credit at all. Many of those people had their tax
returns ﬁlled in by a ﬁnancial adviser, and might view the payment they received
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consider the EITC as a lump sum payment, their response to the credit might not
be as expected.
Eissa and Liebman cast some doubt on the reliability of their regressions due
to the low R2s. Furthermore, the effect on labour supply was investigated in the
two years after the change in the EITC. If one expects that behavioural responses
to the EITC are a long term phenomenon, these ﬁgures do not adequately show
the long-run effects of the EITC on labour supply. The results should therefore
be interpreted with caution.
Scholz ~1996!
Scholz ~1996! also estimated a participation effect by using a different method-
ology than Eissa and Liebman. Instead of estimating the effect of the EITC di-
rectly, he investigated the effect of net wages on the probability of participating.
Intuitively, people outside the labour force who would be eligible for EITC when
working will be encouraged to participate if the EITC is expanded due to the
higher after-tax wages. The tax rate was calculated from the change in after tax
earnings when going from 0 to 20 hours of work, divided by gross earnings.
Probit regressions were run for three groups: single parents, principal wage earn-
ers, and spouses. For all three groups, the parameter of the net wage was positive
and signiﬁcant. Hence, an increase in the after-tax average wage rate raised the
participation rate. These estimates by Scholz suggest that an EITC may indeed
have positive participation effects.
Browning ~1995!
Compared to the previous studies, Browning ~1995! is more pessimistic about the
economic effects of an EITC. He argued that the positive effects on labour sup-
ply in the phase-in range are likely to be smaller than suggested by Dickert et al.
~1995!. This is because many people in the phase-in range during a given year
have higher expected earnings in the future, even without the EITC. As most
labour supply decisions are long term decisions, the positive effect of the EITC
will be diminished if a large share of the people is only temporary in the phase-in
range. The most important effects are thus obtained from the behavioural re-
sponses in the phase-out range.
Browning also showed that the effect of the EITC on disposable income was
ambiguous in the phase-out range. In particular, the high marginal tax rate in the
phase-out range reduced the number of hours worked, thereby causing a decline
in disposable income as well. On balance, disposable income only rised if the
EITC itself dominated the effect through the number of hours worked. For people
with an income above $20,500, Browning estimated that a higher EITC actually
reduced disposable income. This outcome was rather sensitive to the compen-
sated wage elasticity, which was set at 0.3. However, even if the wage elasticity
28 F.M. VAN OERS ET AL.would be reduced to 0.15, a number of EITC recipients would experience a lower
disposable income.
Browning also estimated the effects of the EITC on disposable income for
people in the phase-in range and the ﬂat range. For people in the phase-in range,
disposable income increased by even more than the credit because people tended
to raise the number of hours worked. However, as there were more people in the
phase-out range than in the phase-in range, Browning argued that the overall ef-
fect on labour supply was likely to be negative.
To summarize, research by Dickert et al. and Browning conﬁrm the theoretical
effects of an EITC on labour supply. However, the underlying structure of these
models already determines these expected behavioural responses. The research
conducted by Eissa and Liebman estimated the effect of the EITC on labour sup-
ply directly and did not conﬁrm the theoretical expectations with respect to hours
worked. Moreover, this study estimated only short-run effects on labour supply.
The evidence is thus inconclusive.
2.5 Reform of the EITC
The disadvantages of the EITC have induced some people to come up with al-
ternative designs of the EITC. Yin et al. ~1994! argued that the current design of
the EITC in the US was an obstacle to achieve both compliance and participation
in the program. They, therefore, suggested two alternatives for beneﬁts for the
working poor. The ﬁrst proposal was to divide the EITC into two different ben-
eﬁts. The ﬁrst credit would be a family allowance beneﬁt. The easiest way to
introduce such a beneﬁt would be to provide a beneﬁt for any family with chil-
dren, similar to the Dutch system of child beneﬁt. This favours both low and
high income families. The credit would, however, beneﬁt low-income families
relatively more if this proposal would be accompanied by the abolishment of the
current dependency exemption. The second credit would be an implicit beneﬁt
for the working poor by introducing a tax exemption in the social security tax,
coupled with a higher social security tax rate. The advantage of this proposal
compared to the EITC is that it makes different objectives more transparant. In-
deed, the separation into two credits recognizes that the EITC aims at two dif-
ferent goals, namely, providing income support for poor workers and providing
income support for individuals with children. Another advantage is that the
administrative burden may be reduced. A drawback of the separation into two
credits is that it is ill-targeted on the working poor with children. Indeed, the
family credit would also ﬂow to capital owners and high income workers with
children. This would substantially raise the budgetary costs of the credit. Further-
more, the tax exemption would ﬂow to all working poor, not only those with
children.
The second proposal by Yin et al. was to replace the EITC by indirect assis-
tance to low income workers through a tax beneﬁt directed to their employers.
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workers ~SPAK!. This proposal assumes that there is no fundamental difference
between paying a subsidy to the employer or paying a subsidy to the employee.
Indeed, through equilibrium forces, the tax relief will ultimately fully beneﬁt the
low-paid workers. The advantage of this proposal is that the credit could be tar-
geted on workers with a low hourly wage, rather than workers with a low annual
income. Indeed, information about hourly wages may be available from the ﬁrm.
Accordingly, high wage earners who work a limited number of hours can be ex-
cluded from the program. This brings us closer to the proposal suggested in the
Dutch policy debate which is discussed in the next section.
3 AN EITC IN THE NETHERLANDS
Discussions about a possible EITC in the Netherlands focus on a different type
of EITC than in the US. First of all, it is not primarily aimed at income support.
Therefore, it does not depend on the number of children, while eligibility is re-
lated to individual income, rather than family income. Second, in contrast to the
EITC in the US which is based on annual earned income, the EITC discussed in
the Netherlands is based on hourly wages. Indeed, an EITC based on annual in-
come also accrues to part-time workers with high hourly wages but low annual
income. Since the Netherlands features the highest share of part-time work of all
OECD countries, providing those people with an EITC makes the instrument ill
targeted to the unskilled. For a given budget, each tax relief for part-time work-
ers with high hourly wages crowds out the tax relief for low skilled workers with
full-time jobs and low hourly wages. As the main objective of an EITC in the
Netherlands is to reduce the unemployment rate among the low skilled who col-
lect unemployment beneﬁt, a targeted EITC that depends on hourly wages, rather
than annual income, seems more promising. Indeed, in December 1997 the Dutch
cabinet presented a white paper ‘Taxes in the 21
st century: an investigation’ which
contains a number of tax proposals, including a proposal for the introduction of
an EITC based on hourly wages.
We have adopted the MIMIC model to explore the economic impact of dif-
ferent forms of EITC in the Netherlands. MIMIC is an applied general equilib-
rium model for the Dutch economy that is designed to explore the effects of tax
policies on the Dutch labour market. The model contains a disaggregated descrip-
tion of the household sector by distinguishing 40 types of households. For each
type, the model adopts class-frequency income distributions based on microdata.
This micro-approach makes it possible to make a detailed assessment of the frac-
tion of people in each household type that belongs to a speciﬁed income range.
Accordingly, MIMIC is an appropriate tool to calculate the impact of an EITC
on the labour market. For a more elaborate description of MIMIC, see Gelauff
and Graaﬂand ~1994! and Bovenberg, Graaﬂand, and de Mooij ~2000!.
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credit are taken into account! reduction in tax revenue is 0.35% of GDP ~i.e. 2.5
billion Dutch guilders!.8 The government budget is balanced ex ante by an
equivalent reduction in government consumption. If tax revenues increase due to
behavioural responses, these are used to mitigate the reduction in public consump-
tion. Hence, the ex post effect on public consumption is the long-run budgetary
cost of the EITC.
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3.1 The Wage Distribution in MIMIC
The MIMIC model is calibrated on a data set for 1993. Microdata on income
distribution allow for a detailed assessment of the fraction of people in each
household type that belong to a speciﬁed income range. This is important infor-
mation in order to calculate how many people will be eligible for the EITC.
Table 3.1 provides information on the wage distribution of workers with dif-
ferent levels of skill. MIMIC distinguishes three types of labour: unskilled, low
skilled, and high skilled labour. For each of these skill types, the wage distribu-
tion is presented for two different categories of workers, namely, breadwinners
and elderly workers ~who feature a relatively small labour supply elasticity! and
partners and single people ~who feature a relatively high labour supply elastic-
ity!. Table 3.1 shows the fraction of workers of each category in a particular
income range. It shows that 87% of the unskilled breadwinners and elderly have
an income below 115% of the statutory minimum wage.
10 For the low skilled
this percentage is less than 3%. The fraction of low-skilled workers with an in-
come between 150% and 180% of the minimum wage is relatively large. High-
skilled workers typically earn an income of over 180% of the minimum wage.
For partners and single persons, the wage distribution is more or less similar to
that of breadwinners and elderly, albeit that they tend to earn somewhat lower
wages.
8 For comparison with the US, note that one US$ corresponds to approximately two Dutch guilders
~DFL.!.
9 The budget of the social security funds may change due to an EITC. In that case, we assume that
the government balances the budget of the social security funds by means of a positive or negative
transfer. This ensures that the social premium rates remain ﬁxed ex ante. If the budget of these funds
is affected endogenously due to behavioural responses, the social premium rates may change ex post.
10 The statutory minimum wage in the Netherlands in 1998 was slightly below DFL. 30,000 for a
full-time job.
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This section discusses the simulation results with MIMIC of an EITC that is based
on annual income. This EITC differs from the one implemented in the US tax
system in two respects. First, it depends on individual income, rather than family
income. Second, the EITC analyzed with MIMIC does not depend on the number
of children. Although this alternative design makes it difficult to compare the ef-
fects of MIMIC with the US studies, it forms a benchmark for the simulations in
the next section that involves an EITC based on hourly wages and which was
recently proposed in the Netherlands.
In our experiment, the EITC amounts to 4% of annual labour income in the
phase-in range. The maximum credit is DFL. 1,015 in a ﬂat range between the
statutory minimum wage ~DFL. 30,000! and 115% of the minimum wage ~DFL.
34,500!. Subsequently, the EITC is phased out linearly up to 180% of the mini-
mum wage ~DFL. 54,000!. Accordingly, the marginal tax rate in the phase-out
range rises by more than 5%-points. The effects of the EITC based on annual
incomes on replacement rates, average tax burden and marginal tax burden for
different household types are given in the ﬁrst column of Table 3.2. The ﬁrst
column of Table 3.3 presents the economic effects of the EITC.
Institutional changes
Table 3.2 shows that the EITC reduces the replacement rate for all skill types. In
particular, the net income of workers in all skill types increases while unemploy-
ment beneﬁts remain unchanged. The credit has the largest impact on the replace-
ment rate of the unskilled since the credit is targeted at low annual incomes. The
TABLE 3.1 – THE WAGE DISTRIBUTION IN MIMIC
Percentages
per typea
,115b 115b,x,130b 130b,x,150b 150b,x,180b .180b
Breadwinners/elderly
Unskilled 87.60 8.12 4.29 0.00 0.00
Low skilled 2.70 11.59 21.86 26.45 37.40
High skilled 0.00 0.02 4.97 14.82 80.18
Partners/singles
Unskilled 93.11 5.00 1.89 0.01 0.00
Low skilled 0.67 7.82 12.00 44.12 35.40
High skilled 0.00 1.62 6.28 14.23 77.87
a Based on hourly wage.
b In percentages of minimum wage.
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of households in these types beneﬁt from the EITC ~see the wage distribution in
Table 3.1!. This is also illustrated by the effects on the average employee’s tax
burden: the average tax burden for unskilled workers falls more substantially than
that of skilled workers.
The marginal tax rate for the unskilled falls because a number of them are in
the phase-in range ~where the marginal tax rate drops!, or in the ﬂat range ~where
the marginal tax rate is unchanged!. The high skilled and especially the low
skilled face, on average, a higher marginal tax rate as a number of them fall in
the phase-out range.
TABLE 3.2 – INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES DUE TO AN EITC IN THE NETHERLANDS
ACCORDING TO MIMICa
~1!~ 2!~ 3!~ 4!~ 5!
Replacement ratio 20.44 20.94 20.59 21.21 21.20
– unskilled 22.12 23.81 21.14 25.04 25.16
– low skilled 20.08 20.23 20.56 20.19 0.03
– high skilled 20.04 20.29 20.43 20.37 20.38
Average burden 20.71 20.66 20.74 20.67 20.67
– unskilled 22.68 24.63 21.47 26.64 28.22
– low skilled 21.15 20.95 20.99 20.73 20.51
– high skilled 20.55 20.32 20.71 20.21 20.14
Marginal burdenb 0.81 1.24 20.10 1.01 0.64
– unskilled 21.08 21.26 20.83 21.83 22.38
– low skilled 1.96 4.18 20.07 4.23 4.15
– high skilled 1.02 1.36 0.04 1.10 0.62
a Cumulated differences between simulation and base projection ~effects in absolute
changes!.
b Marginal burden on hourly wages for employees, measured by a weighted average for
different workers in the income distribution.
~1! EITC based on annual income of DFL. 1,015 between 100-115% minimum wage,
phased out at 180%
~2! EITC based on hourly wages of DFL. 1,890 between 100-115% minimum wage, phased
out at 180%
~3! EITC of DFL. 500 not phased out
~4! EITC based on hourly wages of DFL. 2,775 between 100-115% minimum wage, phased
out at 150%
~5! EITC based on hourly wages of DFL. 3,465 between 100-115% minimum wage, phased
out at 130%
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Table 3.3 indicates that an EITC in the Netherlands is an effective instrument to
reduce the unemployment rate.11 Indeed, the lower replacement rate induced by
the EITC stimulates job search by the unemployed and reduces their reservation
wage. Through both channels, the EITC facilitates job matching. Furthermore,
the lower replacement rate weakens the bargaining position of the unions in col-
lective bargaining. Hence, contractual wages fall. Through these channels, unem-
ployment declines. Unemployment for the unskilled falls by 0.76 percentage
points.
12
Table 3.3 also reveals that the EITC increases the participation rate. Indeed,
the lower average tax burden on small part-time jobs encourages partners who
were previously voluntarily unemployed to join the labour force. In contrast, the
average length of the work week falls. This reduction in labour supply in hours
is the result of two opposing forces. On the one hand, secondary earners with
small part-time jobs falling in the phase-in range raise their average labour sup-
ply in hours since their marginal tax burden decreases. On the other hand, pri-
mary earners and single persons reduce their labour supply because of a positive
income effect and, to the extent that they fall in the phase-out range, a negative
substitution effect associated with a higher marginal tax rate. On balance, labour
supply in hours drops.
According to MIMIC, the high marginal tax rate in the phase-out range also
reduces the incentives for training. This is illustrated by the effect on the upgrad-
ing of skills through human capital accumulation. In particular, through adversely
affecting training incentives, the EITC hampers the upgrading of skills, thereby
raising unskilled labour supply at the expense of skilled labour supply. The un-
derlying reason for the adverse effects on training is that a larger part of wage
increases due to productivity gains accrue to the government in the form of a
lower EITC, rather than to the worker. Accordingly, workers ﬁnd it less attractive
to enroll in on-the-job training.
13 Through adverse productivity effects, this miti-
gates the positive effects on consumption. The higher marginal tax burden also
induces substitution from labour supply in the formal sector towards the hidden
economy. Hence, the informal sector expands at the expense of formal activities.
11 The effects on involuntary unemployment have been largely ignored in studies for the US since
structural unemployment is typically a European phenomenon.
12 Ex ante, the after-tax income of workers increases due to the EITC, while the after-tax beneﬁt
level remains unchanged. As social beneﬁts are indexed to gross wages, however, wage moderation
causes a decline in the beneﬁt level ex post. Hence, the price for the positive employment effects is
a reduction in the income of those relying on social beneﬁts. This illustrates the trade-off between
equity and efficiency: tax reductions that are most favourable in raising employment typically harm
equity.
13 Compared to Bovenberg, Graaﬂand, and de Mooij ~1998!, the model used in this paper contains
an alternative framework for on and off-the-job training. This alternative framework is described by
de Mooij ~1999!.
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tion in government consumption smaller than the ex ante reduction of 0.35% of
GDP. Indeed, in the long run the budgetary cost of the EITC is about half of the
ex ante cost.
3.3 An EITC Based on Hourly Wages
This section explores the implications of an EITC that depends on hourly wages
rather than on annual income. In this experiment only workers who hold a full-
time job and earn an hourly wage between the minimum wage and 115% of the
minimum wage are eligible for the maximum EITC. The credit is reduced pro-
portionally for workers who work less hours than a full-time job. Furthermore, it
gradually drops with the level of the hourly wage rate between 115% and 180%
of the minimum wage. This alternative form of EITC is better targeted at the low
skilled than the EITC based on annual income. Indeed, with the same ex ante
budget of 0.35% of GDP, the maximum credit that can be provided to low-
skilled workers with a full-time job almost doubles to DFL. 1,890. The effects of
this form of the EITC according to MIMIC are presented by the second column
of Tables 3.2 and 3.3.14
Institutional variables
Replacement rates are calculated on the basis of a full-time job. A full time
worker within the EITC range beneﬁts more from this credit than from the EITC
based on annual income because of the higher maximum credit. This holds es-
pecially for unskilled workers. Hence, the average tax burden and the replace-
ment rate for the unskilled fall more substantially than in the previous experi-
ment. However, the average tax for skilled workers drops less because skilled
part-time workers who earn high hourly wages are no longer eligible for the
credit.
The high marginal tax rates in the phase-out range only apply to hourly wages.
Indeed, additional hours worked do not reduce the credit. The effects on the mar-
ginal tax rates on higher hourly wages for the different skill types have the same
signs as in the previous experiment. The higher maximum credit makes this in-
crease more pronounced, especially for the low skilled who primarily fall in the
phase-out range ~see Table 3.1!.
14 Note that the minimum wage for people younger than 23 in the Netherlands is below the official
minimum wage for regular workers. As MIMIC does not incorporate these minimum wages for young
workers, a number of people in the income distribution receive wages below the official minimum
wage. As the EITC proposals account for the minimum wage for youngsters, MIMIC thus overesti-
mates the number of people in the phase-in range of the EITC.
35 EARNED INCOME TAX CREDITTABLE 3.3 – ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF DIFFERENT FORMS OF EITC ACCORDING TO THE
MIMIC MODELa
~1!~ 2!~ 3!~ 4!~ 5!
percentage changes
Wage rate 20.39 20.61 20.44 20.68 20.70
Private consumption 1.66 0.74 0.89 0.74 0.73
Labour supply ~pers.! 0.72 0.15 0.3 0.19 0.25
– unskilled 0.74 1.19 0.3 1.75 2.17
– low skilled 1.14 0.04 0.48 20.09 20.10
– high skilled 0.6 20.01 0.26 20.01 0
Labour supply ~hours! 20.20 0 0.05 0.02 0.04
– unskilled 0.63 1.17 0.6 1.58 1.61
– low skilled 20.12 20.24 20.10 20.42 20.43
– high skilled 20.35 20.12 20.11 20.11 20.08
of which through human
capital effect
– unskilled 0.15 0.3 0.04 0.41 0.42
– low skilled 20.05 20.07 0 20.10 20.13
– high skilled 20.01 20.03 20.01 20.04 20.03
Employment 0.48 0.83 0.67 0.91 0.92
– unskilled 1.74 2.84 1.25 3.63 3.9
– low skilled 0.64 0.64 0.79 0.47 0.38
– high skilled 0.22 0.54 0.54 0.58 0.57
Black labour supply 0.9 1.51 0.32 1.88 2.21
absolute changes
Unemployment rate 20.47 20.56 20.41 20.60 20.58
– unskilled 20.76 21.13 20.66 21.37 21.51
– low skilled 20.54 20.63 20.48 20.65 20.59
– high skilled 20.42 20.46 20.37 20.48 20.44
Employment
c 28 49 40 54 54
– unskilled 12 19 9 25 27
– low skilled 77954
– high skilled 9 22 22 24 23
Government consumption
b 20.16 20.04 20.13 20.01 20.01
a Cumulated differences between simulation and base projection.
b In percentage of GDP.
c In 1000 labour years
~1! EITC based on annual income of DFL. 1,015 between 100-115% minimum wage, phased out at
180%.
~2! EITC based on hourly wages of DFL. 1,890 between 100-115% minimum wage, phased out at 180%.
~3! EITC of DFL. 500 not phased out
~4! EITC based on hourly wages of DFL. 2,775 between 100-115% minimum wage, phased out at 150%.
~5! EITC based on hourly wages of DFL. 3,465 between 100-115% minimum wage, phased out at 130%.
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The second columns of Tables 3.2 and 3.3 show that the EITC based on hourly
wages reduces the average tax burden and the replacement rate for unskilled
workers more substantially than the EITC based on annual income. Through skill-
speciﬁc wage formation, the lower average tax and the lower replacement rate
for unskilled work reduces gross unskilled wages, thereby boosting demand for
unskilled labour. Moreover, the lower replacement rate stimulates the search in-
tensity and lowers the reservation wage of the unskilled, thereby facilitating the
matching process for unskilled labour. Accordingly, the unemployment rate for
the unskilled drops more substantially than under the EITC based on annual in-
come.
The rise in the participation rate is smaller than in the previous experiment
and more concentrated among the unskilled. This is because the EITC only re-
duces the average tax burden on part-time jobs with low hourly wages. Indeed,
Table 3.3 reveals that the participation rate of unskilled persons increases sub-
stantially. However, as high-skilled persons are no longer eligible for the EITC,
the participation rate of these persons falls. This latter effect partly reﬂects the
lower transition of initially low-skilled workers into high-skilled jobs since on-
the-job training is discouraged by the EITC ~see below!.
The negative effect on aggregate labour supply in hours is much smaller if the
EITC is based on hourly wages. Indeed, the increase in the marginal tax rate in
the phase-out range only applies to higher hourly wages and not to higher labour
income on account of extra hours worked. Accordingly, labour supply in hours
only drops on account of the income effect. Both the effects on participation and
labour supply in hours are thus smaller ~in absolute value! than in the previous
experiment.
The marginal tax rate on higher hourly wages in the phase-out range rises
more than in the previous experiment because the maximum credit is almost twice
as large. This harms incentives to accumulate human capital. Hence, although an
EITC depending on hourly wages does less harm to the quantity of labour supply
it does more harm to the quality of labour supply. This adverse effect on the
quality of labour supply is reﬂected in a smaller transition of workers from lower
skill levels into higher skill levels. Accordingly, the labour supply of high-skilled
labour falls relative to the base line and the labour supply of unskilled workers
rises. Employment growth on account of the EITC is thus concentrated among
unskilled jobs.
Table 3.3 also reveals that the higher marginal tax burden boosts the size of
the underground economy because employers and workers have more incentives
to pay part of the wage bill in an informal way, i.e. without reporting it to the
tax authority.
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This section employs sensitivity analysis on the EITC based on hourly wages
discussed in the previous section ~i.e. the EITC presented in the second columns
of Tables 3.2 and 3.3!, which is referred to as the benchmark EITC. In particular,
we explore the following three variations regarding the phase-out range of the
EITC.15 First, no phase-out range and a maximum credit of DFL. 500. Second, a
phase-out range between 115% and 150% of the minimum wage and a maximum
credit of DFL. 2775. Finally, a phase-out range between 115% and 130% of the
minimum wage and a maximum credit of DFL. 3465. The results of these simu-
lations are given in the last three columns of Tables 3.2 and 3.3.
No phase-out range
If the EITC is not phased out, each worker with an hourly wage above the mini-
mum wage who holds a full-time job receives a ﬁxed credit of DFL. 500. For
part-time workers the credit is reduced proportionally. In this experiment, the
maximum credit for an unskilled worker is smaller than in the benchmark case,
but more people receive a credit. Accordingly, the replacement rate for the un-
skilled declines less than in the benchmark, but the replacement rate for the high-
skilled and low skilled drops more. Furthermore, without phasing out the EITC,
the marginal tax rate does not increase.
The lower replacement rate increases the search effort of the unemployed, re-
duces their reservation wage, and reduces gross wages as it undermines the threat
point of employees. Subsequently, unemployment falls. As the replacement rate
drops less than in the benchmark, the reduction in unemployment is smaller, es-
pecially for the unskilled.
The participation effect for unskilled partners is smaller than in the benchmark
since the credit for the unskilled is smaller. However, the credit also stimulates
participation of low and high skilled partners on the labour market. Although la-
bour supply in hours may drop slightly due to the income effect, this effect is
dominated by the positive effect on total labour supply due to an increase in the
participation rate.
The marginal tax rate does not rise if the EITC is not phased out. Indeed,
Table 3.2 shows that the marginal tax burden even falls because part-time work-
ers face a lower marginal tax burden on hours worked. This raises their labour
supply, stimulates investments in human capital and reduces black labour supply
compared to the benchmark. Accordingly, this design of the EITC yields more
favourable effects on productivity and consumption, but is less effective in reduc-
ing unemployment.
15 Van Oers ~1998! also employs sensitivity analysis on different phase-in ranges and ﬂat ranges.
The results tend to be rather robust with respect to these ranges, as compared to differences in the
phase-out range.
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trated among the unskilled. Indeed, the ﬁxed EITC does not seriously discourage
training and does not hamper the upgrading of skills. The small decline in human
capital is caused by the lower average tax burden. In particular, as for most people
the marginal tax burden remains unchanged, lower incomes beneﬁt relatively
more from the credit than higher incomes. As training efforts are determined by
relative income differentials between jobs with different skill levels, this slightly
reduces the incentives for training.
Shorter phase-out range
In the benchmark case, the EITC is phased out between 115% and 180% of the
minimum wage. The last two columns of Tables 3.2 and 3.3 show the effects of
two EITCs with alternative, more rapid phase-out ranges, namely, between 115%
and 150% of the minimum wage and between 115% and 130% of the minimum
wage. The advantage of closer targeting is that the maximum credit for people
who earn the minimum wage rate can be higher, thereby cutting the replacement
rate of the unskilled more substantially. Indeed, the maximum credit rises to
DFL. 2775 if the EITC is phased out at 150% of the minimum wage and to
DFL. 3465 if it is phased out at 130% of the minimum wage. Closer targeting
also implies, however, that less people are eligible for the EITC.
The larger reduction in the replacement rate for the unskilled implies a stron-
ger decline in the unemployment rate among the unskilled. As the unemployment
rate is highest among the unskilled, targeting is also effective in cutting the ag-
gregate unemployment rate. Indeed, compared to the benchmark EITC, the mod-
erately targeted EITC is more effective in reducing the aggregate unemployment
rate. However, there tend to be decreasing returns with respect to targeting. In
particular, a moderately targeted version of the EITC is slightly more effective in
reducing the aggregate unemployment rate than the most heavily targeted EITC.
This suggests that an inverse U-shaped curve describes how the effectiveness of
the EITC in cutting unemployment varies with the degree of targeting. Hence,
moderately targeting the EITC seems the most effective way to reduce the over-
all unemployment rate.
In case of a more strongly targeted version of the EITC, less people fall in the
phase-out range where the marginal tax rate increases. However, those who do
fall in the phase-out range feature an extremely high marginal tax rate since a
higher credit is to be phased out over a smaller income range. The adverse ef-
fects on training are thus concentrated among a smaller group, namely the un-
skilled. This is reﬂected by the stronger increase in unskilled labour supply, which
reﬂects the decrease in the transition of workers from unskilled to low-skilled
jobs and from low-skilled into high-skilled jobs. Indeed, the reduced incentives
for on-the-job training hamper the upgrading of skills. Accordingly, the boost in
employment due to the targeted EITC’s is concentrated among unskilled jobs
while skilled employment expands only slightly.
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Graaﬂand and de Mooij ~1999! have adopted the MIMIC model to compare the
effectiveness of the EITC to a number of other instruments suggested in the lit-
erature aimed at reducing unemployment, including cuts in employers’ social se-
curity premiums on low-skilled work, introducing wage subsidies for the long-
term unemployed, and other types of inwork beneﬁts ~see Dreze and Malinvaud
~1994!, Snower and de la Dehesa ~1996!, Haveman ~1996!, and Sørensen ~1997!!.
All these proposals aim to reduce low-skilled unemployment without seriously
damaging the incomes of transfer recipients. Graaﬂand and de Mooij ~1999! show
that, in general, targeting tax cuts at the low skilled or the long-term unemployed
is more effective in reducing unemployment than across-the-board tax reductions.
However, targeted tax cuts typically yield less favourable effects on the quality
and quantity of labour supply and, therefore, on consumption. There seems to be
a trade-off in designing tax reforms between cutting unemployment and stimulat-
ing the quality and quantity of labour supply.
4 CONCLUSIONS
This paper discusses the economic effects of an Earned Income Tax Credit. It
starts with a survey of the literature on the EITC, which mainly originated in the
United States. In the US, the EITC is primarily aimed at reducing poverty among
low-income workers. Indeed, the EITC depends on the number of children in the
household of the worker and annual family income. The literature suggests that
the EITC is likely to have important effects on labour supply behaviour. In par-
ticular, people who did not participate on the labour market before an EITC was
introduced, may be encouraged to start working as the average tax burden drops.
Empirical studies suggest that this participation effect is indeed important. The
effect of the EITC on labour supply in hours, however, is ambiguous. On the one
hand, theory suggests that labour supply falls due to the income effect induced
by the EITC. On the other hand, the EITC causes a positive substitution effect on
labour supply in the phase-in range, but a negative substitution effect in the phase-
out range. On balance, studies yield mixed results regarding the effect on aggre-
gate labour supply in hours.
In the Netherlands the introduction of an EITC would aim at reducing the
unemployment rate among low-skilled workers, rather than providing income sup-
port to poor working families. Indeed, unemployment among the unskilled is still
a structural problem in the Netherlands. The proposals for an EITC in the Neth-
erlands are based on individual hourly wages, rather than on annual family in-
come. Furthermore, the credit does not depend on the number of children. These
modiﬁcations make an EITC more effective as an instrument to reduce the re-
placement rate for low skilled full-time workers. Indeed, our MIMIC simulations
reveal that this targeting principle makes the EITC based on hourly wages more
effective in reducing the unemployment rate, although there tend to be decreasing
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hourly wages does not suffer from adverse incentive effects on the quantity of
labour supply.
Apart from these positive effects, the EITC based on hourly wages also has
some drawbacks. First of all, MIMIC reveals that the high marginal tax burden
on hourly wages may have adverse effects on the incentives for training. This
has negative effects on labour productivity. Furthermore, less training may slow
down the upgrading of skills of those low-skilled people currently in the labour
force, thereby reducing the opportunities for the low-skilled unemployed to ﬁnd a
job.
A second drawback of this type of EITC is that it relies on additional infor-
mation about a worker, namely the number of hours worked in the formal sector.
This information is currently not available to the tax authority in the Netherlands
and seems rather vulnerable to fraud. MIMIC indeed shows that the high mar-
ginal tax burden due to the EITC stimulates workers to report a lower income to
the tax authority than they actually earn. However, MIMIC does not include fraud
related to the number of hours worked. As suggested by van Koesveld ~1998!,
one way out of this problem is to provide the EITC to ﬁrms that employ workers
with low hourly wages, instead of providing it to workers through the tax bill.
Firms are then obliged to transfer the EITC to their employees. The advantage of
this system is that the Dutch government has already introduced a special relief
for social security contributions for those employers who employ workers with
low hourly wages, the so-called SPAK. Hence, information about the number of
hours worked is already available from ﬁrms that are eligible for the SPAK. An-
other advantage of the link between the EITC and the SPAK is that take up is
automatic: if the employer applies for the SPAK, the EITC is automatically paid
to the worker who is also eligible for the SPAK. This link also means that pay-
ment may occur throughout the year instead of a lump sum payment at the end
of the year. A drawback of linking the SPAK and the EITC is that it might be
especially vulnerable to fraud. Indeed, both the employer and the employee face
an incentive to report more hours worked and lower hourly wages than is actu-
ally the case. Therefore, the combination of a SPAK and an EITC based on hourly
wages is unlikely to be a permanent policy measure. Furthermore, it is by no
means certain that the EITC is fully reaped by unskilled workers if it is provided
to the employer. Indeed, the EITC may become subject to a bargaining game
between the employer and the employee. In that case, the EITC may not add
much compared to the existing SPAK.
A ﬁnal drawback of the EITC is that most people receiving low hourly wages
are young single persons or secondary earners who currently do not receive un-
employment beneﬁts ~see CPB ~1997!!. This makes the EITC ill-targeted at the
low-skilled primary earners who are looking for a full-time job. Indeed, most pri-
mary earners with low skills receive wages above 130% of the minimum wage.
41 EARNED INCOME TAX CREDITThese problems in the design of an EITC based on hourly wages have made
the Dutch government reluctant to actually introduce it. Indeed, in its coalition
agreement Parliament has decided upon the introduction of a ﬁxed earned income
tax credit that does not contain a phase-out range. This avoids problems associ-
ated with a high marginal tax rate in the phase-out range or with fraud concern-
ing the number of hours worked. Part-time workers who receive an annual in-
come below the minimum wage will receive a percentage tax credit, rather than
the full credit. This makes the credit better targeted at workers with a full-time
job.
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